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ollowing its rise in popularity through the
late 90s and early 2000s, modern medical
practice has enthusiastically embraced the idea
of evidence-based medicine, or EBM (Claridge
and Fabian 2005, 548). It is now the most widely
accepted medical model, and that popularity has
come with its share of criticism (Greenhalgh et.
al 2014, Haynes 2002, Cohen and Hersh 2004).
With the exception of Maya Goldenberg in her
astute work, On Evidence and Evidence-Based
Medicine: Lessons from the Philosophy of Sci-
ence, few have examined the fundamental episte-
mological processes of evidence creation in EBM.
The goal of this essay is to offer insight to both
clinicians and patients by building upon Gold-
enberg’s work with concrete examples of some of
EBM’s epistemological issues. In doing so, I will
propose that those practicing EBM should scru-
tinize the nature of knowledge informing their
profession so as not to place excessive trust in
clinical research findings. Additionally, health-
care practitioners should augment their critical
understanding of EBM by discussing its guiding
epistemic values and by promoting epistemic hu-
mility throughout medicine. I will begin by fully
explaining the EBM paradigm before moving
into critiques of the model’s portrayed objec-
tivity and use of induction, the gold standard
afforded to randomized controlled trials, and the
label of statistical significance. Finally, I will
briefly discuss some of the aforementioned rec-
ommendations.
What is Evidence-Based Medicine?
Before a critique of EBM can be undertaken,
it is important that the reader knows what ex-
actly is meant by the term and which claims
about knowledge it implies. EBM is currently
accepted as the best-practice model for health-
care practitioners to structure patient treatment
(Goldenberg 2005, 2621). It is a relatively new
paradigm, having only gained popularity in the
late twentieth century (Claridge and Fabian
2005, 548). In 1996, the term was formally de-
fined by McMaster University physician David
Sackett as “the conscientious, explicit, and ju-
dicious use of current best evidence in making
decisions about the care of individual patients”
(Sackett 1996, 71). Sackett’s evidence-based
medicine took influence from Archie Cochrane’s
popular 1972 work,Effectiveness and Efficiency:
Random Reflections on Health Service, similarly
placing vital importance on the use of random-
ized control trials, or RCTs, to assess the ef-
fectiveness of treatments (Claridge and Fabian
2005, 552).
In line with its roots, modern EBM empha-
sizes that healthcare professionals should con-
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stantly be updating their knowledge through
reading new articles relevant to their practice,
with special considerations given to RCTs. Sack-
ett rationalizes that RCTs, and especially sys-
tematic reviews of several RCTs, are the gold
standard for judging a treatment effect since
they are “much more likely to inform us and so
much less likely to mislead us” (Sackett 1996,
72). The status afforded to RCTs means that
they have been ranked at, or near, the top of
nearly fifty hierarchies of evidence (Schu¨nemann
2006, 3). Cohort studies, case-control studies,
and case series find themselves lower on these
hierarchies, supposedly providing progressively
weaker evidence (Burns et al. 2011, 8).
Supporters of EBM believe that by using the
scientific method to assess common clinical prac-
tices, the efficacy of those practices can be deter-
mined. Sharing those experimental results then
allows for clinicians to learn from a wider pool of
patient interventions, informing their practice in
a way that is more rigorous than relying on per-
sonal experience (Timmermans and Mauck 2005,
20). EBM is also thought to reduce the number
of irregularities in clinical procedures, replacing
them with best-practice guidelines. Ultimately,
EBM is seen as a promising way to inform both
patients and clinicians by providing them with
high-quality evidence, which they can then use
to inform their decisions.
In practice, these high hopes for EBM may
not be panning out. In 2001, a study was con-
ducted to determine the critical appraisal skills
and state of knowledge with regard to EBM in
a sample of 286 family physicians from Ontario
(Godwin and Seguin 2003, 4). 95% of respon-
dents saw EBM as important to the practice
of medicine. However, test scores on general
EBM knowledge (including the interpretation
of results and research methods) were around
50% with the average score being just 6.4 out of
12 (Godwin and Seguin 2003, 5). Interestingly,
younger physicians, aged 25-35, scored higher
with an average of 8.2 out of 12 while the old-
est cohort, aged 56-65, scored an average of 4.4
out of 12 (Godwin and Seguin 2003, 6). The
researchers characterized the results as not im-
pressive, especially given that physicians in the
younger cohort would have learnt about EBM
as part of their curriculum (Godwin and Seguin
2003, 6). These findings suggest that clinicians
need to develop their ability to critically evalu-
ate research. Appropriately, that is precisely the
goal of this article.
Philosophy of Science Problematizes
EBM
One of the primary tenets of EBM is that
consulting current best evidence will improve
patient care. Incumbent in this belief is that not
all knowledge can be called evidence. A com-
mon perception is that evidence, and scientific
knowledge in general, is derived from an adher-
ence to the scientific method and produces facts
(Chalmers 2015, xx ). At a very fundamental
level, EBM shares this attitude founded on the
positivist principle that “knowledge should be
derived from the facts of experience” (Chalmers
2015, 3).
Today, philosophers of science understand
that this positivist outlook is not a comprehen-
sive account of scientific inquiry. The first prob-
lem is that our observations cannot lead us to
objective fact, as they are always to some degree
coloured by our past experiences or background
knowledge (Chalmers 2015, 7). The truth of this
statement can be demonstrated in any radiology
department as specialists examining x-rays are
able to expound a host of relevant and detailed
medical information while a non-trained observer
may struggle to determine through which side
of the image light is meant to pass (Chalmers
2015, 8). Critically, it can be understood that
whenever an observation is made in the pur-
suit of science, we are observing phenomena not
as they exist naturally but through a certain
subjective lens. The same holds for medical re-
search: clinical findings cannot be objective in a
conventional sense. Researchers must make deci-
sions on what should count as a specific outcome
(i.e. whether the change in a patient’s condition
should be considered an improvement) and what
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statistical analyses will best illuminate trends in
their data.
It is very difficult to find studies that inves-
tigate how clinicians view research and objec-
tivity. However, critiques of medical education
have suggested that clinicians are often encul-
tured into an objectivist perspective by encour-
aging them to take on the role of “detached
observer” when interacting with patients (Wil-
son 2000, 206). Writing in medical journals
rarely contains first-person language, showing
that perhaps this detached observer mentality
carries on into professional work (Williams 2010,
214). Thus, it may come as a surprise to some
clinicians that despite supposedly strong study
design, the practice of EBM is not entirely ob-
jective or free from personal bias. Clinicians may
then be encouraged to re-evaluate the trust they
place in research findings.
Questioning the Reputation of Random-
ized Controlled Trials (RCTs)
The RCT is one of EBM’s most powerful
tools. First and foremost, randomized controlled
trials are experiments in which one group of
patients receives the treatment being studied
while a control group of patients receives either
the standard treatment or no treatment at all
(Macgill and Murrell 2018). The allocation of
patients is done randomly in order to prevent
the deliberate manipulation of results, although
it will be ensured that common clinically rele-
vant factors like age, sex, or ethnicity are evenly
represented in both groups (Macgill and Murrell
2018). It is posited that by dividing groups in
this way, other unknown but potentially influen-
tial variables will be equally distributed as well
(Worrall 2010, 359). In short, the claim is made
that since RCTs manage to balance all relevant
variables between the two groups such that the
only difference between them is whether or not
they are receiving a particular treatment, it is
the best way in which to measure the treatment
effect.
While RCTs have significant methodologi-
cal strengths, as outlined above, they are not
without fault. One of the issues with RCTs is
that they require researchers to use background
knowledge in the randomization process to cre-
ate groups that are balanced (Worrall 2010,
358). This means that researchers implicitly
evoke hypotheses that may affect the outcome
of the experiment. Thus, the main hypothesis
(of whether or not a certain treatment is effec-
tive) cannot be tested in isolation. This problem
is famously known as the Duhem-Quine thesis
(Sankey 2019).
To illustrate this phenomenon, consider a re-
searcher who chooses to randomize their popula-
tion such that the control and treatment groups
are balanced with respect to sex, age, and eth-
nicity. In this case, the researcher is implicitly
hypothesizing that sex, age, and ethnicity are
the main clinically relevant factors which may
have an impact on how the treatment is received.
However, it may be that after randomization one
group happens to have more subjects who are
smokers than the other. In this case, the study
is not only assessing whether the treatment is
effective, it is also implicitly testing the hypoth-
esis that smoking is not clinically relevant to how
a treatment, or lack thereof, affects a subject.
This is just one (albeit extremely philosophical)
way in which background knowledge informs
and complicates the common understanding of
RCTs.
More practically, researchers can often do
quite well in balancing clinically relevant factors
between two groups provided they have strong
background knowledge of the condition they are
investigating (Deaton and Cartwright 2018, 4).
However, when background knowledge is incom-
plete, it is at least trivially possible that the two
groups remain unbalanced in some significant
way despite randomization (Worrall 2010, 358).
This insight was illustrated by a large RCT in
which 3393 patients with bloodstream infections
were randomized to receive either a prayer for
their well-being and full recovery or no prayer at
all (Leibovici 2001, 1450). The researchers en-
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sured that the treatment and control groups were
matched in all relevant factors. Having taken the
standard precautions, it came as a great surprise
that those in the prayer group’s “length of stay
in hospital and duration of fever were signifi-
cantly shorter” (Leibovici 2001, 1450). With-
out a plausible mechanism in which prayer may
act as a viable treatment for bloodstream infec-
tions, the researcher admitted that his results
must have been influenced by a host of unknown
factors and that the experiment was in fact a
“non-study” (Worrall 2010, 359). In replying
to his own work, Leibovici said that his goal
was to encourage readers to question whether
they would consider studies that were method-
ologically correct even if such a study lacked a
plausible biological mechanism (Leibovici 2002).
Although quite contrived, this high-profile case
illustrates how evidence from RCTs cannot al-
ways be attributed solely to the treatment itself.
Once RCTs are published, it then becomes
important for clinicians to translate that knowl-
edge to their practice. The implicit belief is that
trends observed in a sample group will carry over
to patients provided that the studied group is
sufficiently large and has similarities to the pa-
tients in question. Extrapolating a conclusion in
this way is known as induction. However, EBM
too often considers only a very small subsection
of the population.
The National Institute of Health’s Revital-
ization Act was passed in 1993 with the goal of
increasing the number of women and racial mi-
norities participating in research (Oh, 1). How-
ever, a 2015 study concluded that most health-
care practitioners and researchers are “informed
by research extrapolated from a largely homoge-
nous population, usually white and male” (Oh,
1). Less than one percent of cancer clinical
trials focus on racial or ethnic minority popu-
lations, and minority populations were under-
represented in cancer research as a whole (Chen
et al. 2014, 1093). Cardiovascular research suf-
fers from a similar problem: less than a quarter
of studies reported patient race while females
made up just 30% of RCT samples (Sardar et
al. 2014, 1868-69).
With practitioners of EBM likely treating a
much more diverse group of patients, the argu-
ment of induction from clinical trials’ evidence to
general healthcare practice does not always hold.
Research participant samples may not align with
the characteristics of patients who require care,
meaning that clinicians must be wary of trans-
ferring insights from research to their practice.
In order to improve the applicability of findings,
it is imperative that researchers work towards
both reporting on and diversifying the make-up
of their participant samples.
Here is reason to question EBM’s faith in
RCTs as the gold standard for evidence. This is
not to say that other study designs are more or
less appropriate in a clinical setting. However,
if a healthcare practitioner adopts a treatment
method because it has been proven effective by
an RCT, and if they accept EBM’s proposition
that RCTs provide the best high-quality evi-
dence, they may put more trust in their new
protocol than is potentially warranted.
The Role of Statistical Significance in
Evidence-Based Medicine
One of the ways that healthcare practitioners
judge whether or not to follow a new treatment
protocol is by looking to see if a study achieves
statistical significance. In many medical jour-
nals, and in science more generally, statistical
significance is commonly represented by a p-
value that indicates the likelihood that a certain
result could have occurred purely due to random
chance. For example, a p-value of 0.025 would
suggest that there was a 2.5% chance that the re-
sults of the study could have occurred randomly;
in this case, the interpreter would conclude that
the results were likely due to the effect of the
treatment. But at what point is a p-value suf-
ficiently small enough for researchers to decide
that the treatment was effective or not? Gen-
erally, if the study returns a p-value of greater
than 0.05, the result would not be considered
statistically significant while a p-value of less
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than 0.05 would indeed indicate a significant re-
sult.
This is problematic for a number of rea-
sons. First, the threshold of p≤0.05 may incline
healthcare practitioners to develop very differ-
ent beliefs about a treatment based on whether
or not it carries the label of statistical signif-
icance (Walsh et al. 2014, 623). In reality, a
treatment with a p-value of 0.049 is probably
not much more effective than a treatment with a
p-value of 0.051. Additionally, it is possible that
clinicians may put the same amount of faith in
studies with similar p-values without consider-
ing other indicators of quality in a trial such as
the number of events that occurred or the size
of the control and intervention groups (Walsh et
al. 2014, 623). Of course, not all clinicians may
fall into this simplified way of thinking.
The broader issue here is that the p-value
offers a dichotomous choice of significant vs.
non-significant when it should instead present
itself on a spectrum. The first time a threshold
of p≤0.05 was suggested as a way to determine
statistical significance was in Fisher’s Statisti-
cal Methods for Research Workers, published
in 1925 (Cowles and Davis 1982, 553). A year
later, Fisher made this claim more explicit by
saying that “personally, [he] prefers to set a low
standard of significance at the 5 per cent point”
although others may feel comfortable using a
different standard (Fisher 1926, 504). Thus, the
choice of which p-value threshold one uses is
subjective. If pre-determined thresholds and the
significant versus non-significant binary were re-
moved, clinicians who evaluate the data would be
better able to appraise the strength of a study’s
claims on their own terms.
Furthermore, recent research by Walsh et
al. has showed that p-values in medical litera-
ture are not very stable. This phenomenon has
been described by the Fragility Index, a measure
that reports the minimum number of patients
whose outcome would have to change in order
for a statistically significant result to become
non-significant (Walsh et al. 2014, 623). High
scores are indicative of a robust study since the
p-value would have risen above 0.05 only if a
higher number of patients showed different out-
comes. Lower scores suggest that the study’s
results are fragile, as the p-value would have
risen above 0.05 if just a few patients had ex-
perienced different outcomes. In a systematic
review examining 399 trials with a median sam-
ple size of 682 patients, it was found that the
median Fragility Index was 8 (Walsh et al. 2014,
622). Remarkably, Walsh examined a study that
enrolled 2316 patients and reported a p-value of
0.04, yet had a Fragility Index of 1; had just one
of those 2316 patient experienced an unfavorable
outcome, the study would have lost significance
(Walsh et al. 2014, 626). In 53% of trials, the
Fragility Index was less than the number of pa-
tients lost to follow-up, suggesting that if they
had been retained, the treatment may not have
been labelled as significantly effective (Walsh et
al. 2014, 622).
Although more research needs to be done to
properly judge whether medicine suffers from a
widespread case of fragile results, these findings
do indicate the need for healthcare professionals
to look beyond the “statistically significant” la-
bel when deciding whether or not to alter their
practice. It is thus very important for clinicians
to look critically at studies before placing trust
in them, if they do not do so already.
Having laid out some concerns with EBM
from a philosophy of science perspective, two
recommendations for improvement will now be
provided.
1. Consider Epistemic Values
Given how RCTs and p-values can some-
times be misleading, healthcare practitioners
and researchers could benefit from a discussion
on epistemic values. The term “epistemic val-
ues” encompasses what is “acceptable in science
as guidance for theory choice”; in this way, the
values lay down the standards of evidence in a
certain discipline (Douglas 2007, 120). In any
clinical study, authors often decide how they
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will interpret data in accordance with the model
of study design they have chosen. However,
researchers rarely discuss the reasons behind
their methodological decisions to avoid colour-
ing their paper with subjectivity (Douglas 2007,
123). This is not ideal since every choice that
a researcher makes in the course of their study
could potentially lead to error.
For example, imagine a scenario in which the
marker of statistical significance is a p-value of
less than 0.02. In this case, treatments would
be held to a higher standard and the risk of dis-
counting effective treatments would increase. In
the current practice of EBM, the 0.05 threshold
encourages practitioners to try potentially ben-
eficial treatments even if they are more likely to
fail (or do harm) than a 0.02 threshold would
recommend. Clearly, the choice to adopt the
0.05 benchmark must have been the product of
a value-based decision that prioritizes the po-
tential benefits of novel action over the potential
harms of inaction.
If researchers explicitly stated why they
judged their evidence by certain standards and
what epistemic values influenced their practical
choice to designate a certain study as statis-
tically significant, it would be easier for EBM
practitioners to discuss how epistemic values in-
fluenced the confidence with which they applied
a new treatment. This is especially important in
cases where the treatment falls right on the edge
of the threshold for statistical significance.
2. Strive for Epistemic Humility
Another way in which the field of EBM may
be improved is by embracing the practice of
expressing claims with epistemic humility. This
means that healthcare professionals should strive
to communicate to patients the degree to which
the evidence suggests that a certain claim is
accurate, or a treatment is effective (Schwab
2018, 29). This also helps to encourage health-
care practitioners to recognize the uncertainty
in their field, and to nuance their professional
judgement more carefully than the brutally sim-
plistic dichotomous distinctions of statistical sig-
nificance or RCT versus non-RCT. Additionally,
it may be helpful for patients to become in-
formed about p-values, the Fragility Index, and
other common metrics of a study’s strength so
that they can make an informed choice regarding
their treatment (Schwab 2018, 41). With epis-
temic humility being such a simple yet powerful
addition to a healthcare practitioner’s toolkit, it
is undoubtedly a practice that should be more
widely encouraged.
Conclusion
What started as a mutter among researchers
at McMaster University has turned into a shout
echoing across the world of healthcare: evidence-
based medicine has come a long way and it is
likely here to stay. Rather than decrying such a
meteoric rise in prominence, this essay’s philoso-
phy of science analysis was meant to nuance the
reader’s understanding of current medical prac-
tice thus enabling them to navigate the field of
EBM as a better-informed healthcare provider
or patient. Traditional markers of quality evi-
dence like RCTs and the statistically significant
label were analysed, encouraging the reader to
carefully examine available evidence in order to
adopt the best treatment practices. It is my
hope that with these things in mind, both pa-
tients and practitioners will be able to make
carefully considered decisions and advocate for
more openness in the research process.
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